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Abstract  
All that we know about the CEO labour market in China comes from studies of public 
listed companies and State-owned enterprises (SOEs). This paper is the first to examine 
the operation of the CEO labour market across all industrial sectors of the Chinese 
economy. We find that the influence of the State extends beyond SOEs into many 
privately-owned firms. Government is often involved in CEO appointments in domestic 
firms and, when this is the case, the CEO has less job autonomy and is less likely to have 
pay linked to firm performance. Nevertheless, we find that incentive schemes are 
commonplace and include contracts linking CEO pay directly to firm performance, 
annual bonus schemes, the posting of performance bonds, and holding company stock. 
The elasticity of pay with respect to company performance is one or more in two-fifths of 
the cases where CEOs have performance contracts, suggesting many face high-powered 
incentives. We also show that State-owned and domestic privately-owned firms are more 
likely than foreign-owned firms to use incentive contracts.  
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1. Introduction 
In the last few decades a huge privatisation programme has reduced State ownership of 
enterprises in China (Xu, 2011). Nevertheless, the State continues to play a pivotal role in 
the corporate sector through its ownership of firms and in appointing Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs). Little is known about State influence within corporations since the 
economic reform programme began. This paper focuses on three issues, namely the 
influence the State has on the appointment of CEOs, the way CEOs are paid and how 
much decision-making autonomy CEOs have. To date evidence has been confined to the 
role State ownership plays in determining CEO compensation in large State-owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) (Mengistae and Xu, 2004) and public listed firms (Bryson et al., 
2014). In this paper we extend the analysis to the executive labour market and CEO 
compensation across the whole industrial sector in China. We do so with World Bank 
Enterprise Data from surveys conducted in 2003 and 2005, two decades after the initial 
market-inspired reforms and a phenomenal period of economic growth.
2
 We consider the 
role played by the State in CEO appointments and the autonomy CEOs have over 
decisions relating to production, investment and employment. Then we consider whether 
State involvement in corporations affects the way CEOs are paid, focusing primarily on 
the incidence and correlates of various aspects of CEO incentives.   
 
We find the State is often involved in the appointment of CEOs and that, where the 
corporation is State-owned, CEOs have far less decision-making autonomy. Incentive 
schemes are commonplace and include contracts linking CEO pay directly to firm 
performance, annual bonus schemes, the posting of performance bonds, and holding 
company stock. The elasticity of pay with respect to company performance is one or 
more in two-fifths of the cases where CEO's have performance contracts, suggesting 
many face high-powered incentives. We show foreign-owned firms are less likely than 
State-owned and domestic, privately-owned firms to use incentive contracts. However, 
where government is involved in the CEO's appointment in a domestic, privately-owned 
firm, the CEO has less job autonomy and is less likely to have pay linked to firm 
performance.  
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 See the Appendix for descriptions of the two data sets. 
 In Section Two we consider the role of the State in China's corporations and the possible 
implications for CEOs. Section Three analyses the links between State involvement in 
corporations and CEO's autonomy in making decisions. Section Four examines the 
degree to which CEOs in China are exposed to incentive contracts. Section Five estimates 
influences of CEO incentive contracts, focusing again on State ownership and State 
involvement in the appointment of CEOs before we discuss the results and conclude in 
Section Six. 
 
2. The Role of the State in China's Corporations and Its Implications for CEOs 
The standard principal-agent problem described in the CEO compensation literature 
assumes CEOs are recruited to maximise shareholder value by raising the profitability of 
the firm but that, in the absence of perfect monitoring, CEOs may invest time in 
improving their own future career prospects, perhaps to the detriment of the firm 
(Holmström and Milgrom, 1991). Shareholders therefore use incentive mechanisms and 
the threat of dismissal to hold CEOs accountable.
3
  
 
The Chinese setting is different because the State and economic activity are inextricably 
linked in China. The State exerts direct influence over corporations as the owner 
(principal). For example, despite divesting itself of many previously State-owned 
enterprises and reducing its stake in publicly listed firms in recent decades, the State 
continued to have a majority stake in over two-fifths of publicly listed firms in 2010, and 
these accounted for three-quarters of the employment in the sector and four-fifths of its 
output (Bryson et al., 2014). State ownership is also common in the economy as a whole. 
According to the World Bank 2003 Enterprise Survey, the mean State ownership stake in 
enterprises was 22%, ranging from 63% in the one-third of organizations which were 
SOEs, a 20% stake in public listed firms, one-sixth State ownership in cooperatives, and 
near-zero involvement in privately held firms. Twenty-one percent of corporations were 
majority State-owned, 12% were majority foreign-owned, and the remainder were 
majority domestically-owned.  
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 The State's influence extends beyond ownership to the appointment or endorsement of 
CEOs. In 2003 the State had direct influence over who was appointed to the CEO 
position in a quarter of all firms, directly appointing them in 12% of cases and 
rubber-stamping the firm's nominee in another 13% (Table 1). The role of the State was 
most prominent in firms that were majority State-owned with government directly 
appointing over one-third of CEOs and rubber-stamping firm nominees in another 
one-quarter of cases. In domestic and foreign firms, it was the Board of Directors that 
usually made appointments. But State involvement was not uncommon even in these 
firms. A similar picture emerges from the 2005 survey: CEOs were State appointments in 
around one-tenth (12%) of all firms, ranging from 48% in SOEs to only 2% in 
foreign-owned firms.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
China remains a one-party State governed by the Communist Party. Cao et al. (2012) 
showed that the political system offers strong career incentives to CEOs which may 
compensate for monetary incentives. We are able to glimpse the role that political 
advancement might play in the CEO labour market in China in Table 2 which shows the 
Communist Party membership of CEOs in 2003. Two-thirds of all CEOs were Party 
members. The figure varies markedly by ownership status: over nine-in-ten CEOs of 
SOEs are Party members, compared to two-thirds of those in private domestic firms and 
only one-quarter of those in the foreign-owned sector.
4
 Furthermore, many CEOs hold 
senior positions in the Party, with around one-quarter holding the post of Party Secretary.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
 
Although this evidence points to an important role for the State in corporate affairs, this 
does not necessarily mean that politically motivated CEOs operate simply as 
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 The low incidence of Party membership among CEOs of firms that are majority foreign-owned is 
partially explained by the prevalence of foreign CEOs in such firms. Around three-fifths (57%) of their 
CEOs are Chinese and, among this group, 44% are Party members. 
"bureaucrats" with few incentives and little autonomy. This is because political 
preferment often depends on CEOs demonstrating business success (Xu, 2011). As early 
as the 1980s a market for corporate executives started to emerge as a result of 
government initiatives to reform SOEs. Prompted by career incentives to enhance the 
productivity and performance of SOEs, local government officials opened up competition 
for CEO posts in SOEs through auctions for managerial contracts (Xu, 2011). These 
contracts offered CEOs greater autonomy in corporate decision-making and replaced 
direct control from above with managerial incentives (Groves, 1995: 874), a process 
which received a further fillip with the programme of privatisation which began in the 
1980s.  
 
In the remainder of this paper we consider what difference State ownership and influence 
makes to the role CEOs play and how they are compensated. If State ownership leads to 
CEO "bureaucrats" we would expect to see a negative association between State 
involvement and CEO job autonomy and a negative association between State 
involvement and the use of incentive contracts. On the other hand, if the reforming ethos 
of the 1980s has persisted, one might anticipate quite the reverse. 
 
3. State Involvement in Corporations and CEO Autonomy 
If China's CEOs were simply bureaucrats, paid to perform tasks required by the State, 
one might expect their behaviours to be governed by procedures laid down by the State, 
in which case they would have little of the operational autonomy which one normally 
associates with the position of CEO. The 2005 survey asks what degree of autonomy 
CEOs have over decisions relating to production, investment and employment, defining 
autonomy as non-intervention by government. As Table 3 indicates, CEOs generally have 
a high degree of autonomy over operational decision-making which means that firms' 
owners will be concerned to align CEO interests with those of the firm, whether it be 
through political preferment, financial incentives, or via the threat of dismissal. Six-in-ten 
(61%) CEOs score the maximum autonomy score.
5
 However, there is heterogeneity 
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 They tend to have more autonomy over production and employment than they do over investment 
decisions (figures not shown). 
across firms both within and across ownership-type. CEOs in SOEs tend to have lower 
autonomy than those in other firms, with those in the private domestic sector having 
significantly more autonomy than others.
6
 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
 
To see whether this relationship is a robust association that is independent of other firm 
and CEO characteristics, we ran linear estimation models for the probability of a CEO 
having "full autonomy" on the additive scale shown in Table 3, which combines  
autonomy on three dimensions of decision-making (production, investment and 
employment). These models are city fixed-effects models, allowing us to compare firms 
within the same city. There is a strong negative association between majority State 
ownership of the firm and CEO autonomy (Table 4, column 1). The State ownership 
effect is quantitatively large and statistically significant relative to all other forms of 
ownership. Furthermore, if the CEO was appointed by government this is associated with 
even lower CEO autonomy: a CEO is 13 per cent less likely to have "full autonomy" if 
appointed by government, ceteris paribus.  However, the effect is confined to firms that 
are not State-owned (Table 4, columns 2 and 3). 
 
If one focuses on each component of autonomy the differential between State ownership 
and other forms of ownership tends to be statistically significant throughout but the 
effects are largest with respect to decisions over investment and are least pronounced 
with respect to production issues.
7
 The same pattern is apparent with respect to the 
association with government appointment. 
 
It is therefore clearly the case that State involvement in corporations, whether through 
ownership or through the appointments process, is associated with CEO's having more 
limited decision-making autonomy. 
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 We get similar results using the 2003 survey. 
7
 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
 
4. Is CEO compensation linked to firm performance and if so, how? 
The suspicion that the State appoints "bureaucrats" to CEO positions, together with a 
common assumption that political advancement is the preferred career path for many 
CEOs in China, suggests State-owned firms may be less likely than other firms to resort 
to incentive pay to resolve principal-agent problems. On the other hand, the State has a 
strong track record in experimenting with incentive structures in SOEs (Xu, 2011) and, 
more recently, in paving the way for the use of stock options and other incentive 
mechanisms in the publicly listed sector (Bryson et al., 2014).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
 
The 2005 survey indicates that two-thirds (67%) of firms linked their CEO's annual 
income directly to the company's performance (Table 5). What is more, in one-quarter 
(23%) of firms, these were "high powered" incentives in the sense that more than 10% of 
the CEO's annual income depended on whether or not the company's performance met 
the agreed target. Incentive contracts were common across all ownership types, though 
they were less common in foreign-owned firms than elsewhere.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
 
The 2003 survey contains more detail on the means by which firms can link CEO 
compensation to firm performance (Table 6). It distinguishes between being on an 
incentive plan which links CEO income to performance (what we term an incentive 
contract); receipt of a wage paid annually which, under the Chinese system, is a method 
of paying annual bonuses; and the payment of an upfront bond by the CEO which is 
recovered if the CEO meets the performance targets set under the contract.
8
  
One-quarter (28%) of CEOs in the survey were on incentive contracts. In most cases 
annual income was linked to performance measured in terms of both profits and sales.  
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One-fifth (19%) of CEOs were on annual pay contracts, and 11% paid a performance 
bond. Taken together, two-fifths (42%) of CEOs had their pay subject to performance 
based on at least one of these mechanisms and 15% were subject to more than one of 
these links between income and performance. These figures are lower than the incentive 
contract incidence in the 2005 survey due in part to differences between the two samples 
and the survey questions
9
, but the 2003 survey confirms that the incidence of 
incentive-based contracts for CEOs was lowest in foreign owned firms. 
 
Incentives are often high powered. The median elasticity of pay with respect to company 
performance was 1.
10
 The performance bonds paid by CEOs often constituted a sizeable 
proportion of their total annual income (Bryson et al., forthcoming).   
 
The 2003 survey also asked whether CEOs held company stock, another potentially 
important way in which CEOs' performance can affect their wealth. Almost a third (30%) 
of CEOs held stock (Table 6, row 6). In 13% of domestically owned private firms the 
CEO actually held a majority stake in the firm as owner-manager. 
 
The four incentive mechanisms identified in the 2003 survey are positively and 
significantly correlated, suggesting that they may complement one another, rather than 
operate as substitutes.
11
 
 
This section clearly demonstrates that incentive payments are widespread among CEOs 
in China, that they take a variety of forms but appear complementary to one another, and 
that the link between pay and performance is quite substantial. 
                                                 
9
 For example, average firm size is lower in the 2003 survey. 
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 Respondents were asked how much the CEO's income would increase if the performance measure 
increased by 1%. They were asked this for the first and second most important measures of performance 
used to make the decision. They were also asked the same question in relation to decreases in performance. 
Thus there are four questions asked. In each case the median elasticity of pay to performance was 1.0. 
11
 The correlation coefficients for a CEO incentive contract and other incentive mechanisms are all 
statistically significant at a 99% confidence level and are: annual pay contract (bonuses) 0.29; performance 
bond 0.16; holds company stock 0.09. The correlation coefficients for annual pay contract and a 
performance bond is 0.05 and its correlation with performance bonds is 0.09. Again, both coefficients are 
statistically significant at a 99% confidence level. The only correlation that is not statistically significant is 
that between a performance bond and stock holding (0.003, p = 0.87).  
 5. The State's Influence on CEO compensation  
The overall impression from the two surveys is that incentive contracts were widely used 
to link CEO income to company performance in the mid 2000s and that, in many 
instances, these were high powered incentives which placed a sizeable percentage of 
CEO income at stake. However, there is quite a bit of variance in their usage, as is clear 
from the cross-tabulations with ownership. In this section we seek to isolate the 
association between CEO incentive contracts and the role of the State in corporations 
using multivariate analyses. In doing so, we control for other firm characteristics (such as 
size, industry and location), the firm's corporate governance arrangements, other policies 
used by the firm such as the threat of dismissal, and the characteristics of the CEO. 
 
Models therefore take the following form: 
 
1) ficfziyfxifc CITYXIndCGComp    
 
where Compifc is a dummy identifying contracts linking pay to performance for CEO i in 
firm f in city c; CGf is a vector of corporate governance variables in firm f, including 
whether the CEO was a government appointee; Indi are individual CEO demographic and 
job attributes; Xf are structural firm attributes which include the majority owner of the 
firm; CITYc are the city fixed effects; epsilon is the error term and the betas are 
coefficients to be estimated. In practice, the absence of panel data means that we observe 
only one CEO per firm and so the i and f are non-separable. 
 
We run separate models for the 2005 and 2003 data sets to establish how robust results 
are to alterations in sampling and populations. We present linear estimates with standard 
errors clustered to account for city-level sampling. There are two variants of the model 
specification for the 2003 data. The first mimics the specification for the 2005 analysis. 
The second extends the model to accommodate some variables that are only available in 
2003, such as Communist Party membership. Furthermore, we use the richer data on the 
nature of incentives in the 2003 data to run the models on three variants of the incentive 
contract, namely: a simple dummy identifying whether the CEO has a contract linking 
pay to firm performance; a dummy variable identifying any of the three incentive forms 
of contract (a link to performance; an annual bonus; and a performance bond); and finally 
a count of up to three identifying the number of types of incentive mechanism to which 
the CEO is subject.  
 
Table 7 presents the factors associated with CEO incentive contracts in 2005. Table 8 
then presents six models using the 2003 survey data. Columns 1, 3 and 5 in Table 8 are 
model specifications similar to those for Column 1 in Table 7 but for each of the three 
alternative incentive contract measures in turn (paid via a contract linking pay to 
performance, any of the three types identified, and the count of the three types of 
incentive contract). Columns 2, 4 and 6 run the same models but include additional 
controls that are only available in the 2003 data. The models explain between 7 and 13 
per cent of the variance in incentive contracts, depending on the model specification and 
dependent variable. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 7] 
 
We focus the discussion on firm ownership, the role government plays in appointing 
CEOs, and Communist Party membership of the CEO.  But we also briefly discuss the 
links between performance pay and CEO autonomous decision-making.
12
 
 
In the 2005 analyses, when ownership and a dummy for government involvement in CEO 
appointments are entered alone (not shown in the table), without controls, majority state 
ownership is associated with a higher probability of a CEO being paid under an incentive 
contract than those in other firms.  However, the only difference that is robust to the 
inclusion of controls is that between state-ownership and foreign ownership: foreign 
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 It is perhaps worth noting that other variables operate in a fashion that is consistent with theory. For 
instance, Rosen (1990: 3) argued that the market will allocate the most talented CEOs to the largest firms 
“where the marginal productivity of their actions is greatly magnified over the many people below them to 
whom they are linked”.  It is not surprising, therefore, that incentive contracts are more prevalent in larger 
firms in both the 2005 and 2003 data sets. 
 
owned firms are significantly less likely to use incentive contracts for CEOs (column 
1).
13
  The 20 percentage point differential is large.  However, government involvement 
in the appointment of the CEO is negatively associated with the use of CEO incentive 
contracts.  When splitting the sample into firms where the state holds a majority stake 
and those where it does not, it is apparent that the role of government in appointments is 
only significant where the firm is majority-owned by government (columns 2 and 3). 
 
From a principal-agent perspective it makes sense to incentivise CEO’s via a 
performance pay contract if the CEO has sufficient autonomy to make meaningful 
operational decisions affecting the firm’s fortunes.  Both surveys distinguish between 
CEO’s autonomy over decision-making in three domains: production, employment and 
investment. In the 2005 survey the likelihood of employing a CEO on an incentive 
contract rises with autonomy over production matters, but falls where the CEO has 
greater autonomy over investment decisions, while autonomy over employment-related 
matters (hiring, firing and wages) is not significantly associated with incentive contracts.  
These findings seem to hold in both the state-owned and non-state owned sectors 
(columns 2 and 3). This negative association between incentive contracts and investment 
autonomy makes intuitive sense since principals may be concerned that a CEO’s 
judgement regarding the appropriateness of an investment decision may be clouded by 
any direct personal interest in the impact of that decision.  For example, CEO’s may 
choose to forego investment opportunities in the short-run, even if they are in the best 
interests of the firm, if making the investment negatively affects the short-term company 
performance metrics used in an incentive contract to reward CEO’s. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 8] 
 
In Table 8 we turn to similar analyses for the 2003 survey. The negative significant 
association between incentive contracts and foreign ownership is also apparent in the 
2003 data regardless of model specification and across the three incentive contract 
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 This result holds when replacing majority ownership variables with any ownership, with the percentage 
owned by each owner type, or by the registered ownership status of the firm. 
measures (Table 8). There is also a negative association between the use of CEO 
incentive contracts and the appointment of the CEO by government, one that is 
statistically significant in four of the six models. This is consistent with the possibility 
that government may have a direct interest in appointing more “bureaucratic” CEOs 
capable of achieving political and social objectives, rather than CEO’s intent on 
maximising firm performance. 
 
We see further influence of government influence in the corporate sector in terms of the 
link between Communist Party membership and CEO status. There is a positive and 
significant correlation between being a Party Secretary or Deputy Party Secretary 
(denoted by "high rank in the CP") and being paid for performance. This is consistent 
with the idea that firms use incentive contracts to attract the most talented employees to 
the position of CEO since achievement of high status in the Communist Party is often 
viewed as a marker of ability (Li et al., 2007).
14
 However, we cannot discount the 
possibility that status in the Communist Party simply proxies the quality of individuals' 
political connections which gives them access to the best education and jobs. 
 
In 2003, the use of incentive contracts is positively associated with autonomy in 
employment decision-making, whereas autonomy in production is not significant. But, as 
in the 2005 survey, the 2003 survey reveals a negative association between investment 
autonomy and the use of incentive contracts.  
 
6. Conclusion  
This paper is the first to examine the operation of the CEO labour market across all 
industrial sectors of the Chinese economy. We do so using World Bank enterprise data 
for the first part of the 21st Century. Incentive schemes are commonplace and include 
contracts linking CEO pay directly to firm performance, annual bonus schemes, the 
posting of performance bonds, and holding company stock. These incentive mechanisms 
appear to complement rather than substitute for one another. The elasticity of pay with 
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Incentive contracts are often used to attract the best managers to a firm since they can expect to earn more 
where their pay is a function of their higher productivity (Lazear, 2000).   
respect to company performance is one or more in two-fifths of the cases where CEOs 
have performance contracts, suggesting many face high-powered incentives.  
 
We find government involvement in the appointment of a CEO reduces the likelihood 
that the CEO will receive an incentives-based contract, perhaps because governments 
appoint “bureaucrats” to perform roles which incorporate social and political as well as 
economic goals. However, the link between state ownership and the use of CEO contracts 
is not so clear cut: indeed, it appears that foreign-owned firms are the least likely to use 
CEO incentive contracts, perhaps reflecting the fact that it was the state that had 
originally sponsored and promoted managerial incentives in SOEs. 
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Table 1: Who Appoints the CEO's? 
Column percentages 
 Majority Owner: 
 Domestic Foreign State No 
majority 
All 
Firm nominates, govt approves 11 4 24 9 13 
Government appointment 6 2 37 12 12 
Board of Directors appoints 40 74 15 67 38 
Decided at shareholders' meeting 13 5 1 3 10 
Appointed at employees' meeting 1 0 2 0 1 
Other 28 15 21 9 25 
Unweighted N 1661 169 503 33 2366 
 
Note: authors' calculations from the World Bank Investment Climate Survey 2003. Figures are 
column percentages.  
 
Table 2: Communist Party Position of CEOs 
Column percentages 
 Majority Owner: 
 Domestic Foreign State No 
Majority 
All 
Party Secretary 20 9 34 45 23 
Deputy Party Secretary 5 1 16 0 7 
Committee or Executive 
Member 
11 3 23 6 13 
Ordinary member 28 12 19 16 25 
Not a member 37 74 8 32 33 
Unweighted N 1651 163 505 31 2350 
 
Note: authors' calculations from the World Bank Investment Climate Survey 2003. Figures are 
column percentages. 
Table 3: Job autonomy Among CEOs In China, 2005 
Row percentages 
 Majority ownership status: Low Medium High 
State 34 28 38 
Collective 21 23 56 
Corporation 19 23 58 
Private 11 17 72 
Foreign 18 21 61 
No majority owner 20 25 56 
 
Note: authors' calculations from the World Bank Investment Climate Survey 2005. Respondents 
asked to score their autonomy using an 8-item scale where 0=1-19% autonomy and 7=100% 
autonomy. Our scale sums scores on the three issues covered, namely production, investment, 
employment. Low scores are 0-16; medium scores are 17-20; high score is the maximum 21. 
Figures are row percentages. N=12,265. 
 
  
Table 4: Influences on CEO Job Autonomy 
Dependent variable: Full autonomy of CEO 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
Coeff. 
 
Coeff. 
 
Coeff. 
 
Firm Characteristics: 
      Majority ownership: State ref. 
    
   Private 0.160 *** 
   
            [9.19] 
    
   Collective 0.056 *** 
   
            [2.69] 
    
   Corporation 0.091 *** 
   
 
 
[5.33] 
    
   Foreign 0.147 *** 
   
 
 
[7.03] 
    
   No majority ownership 0.097 *** 
   
 
 
[3.38] 
    
 Size (Log of employees) -0.017 *** -0.019 *** -0.003 
 
 
[-4.57] 
 
[-4.85] 
 
[-0.31] 
 Age (Log of years) -0.020 *** -0.022 *** -0.029 * 
 
[-2.91] 
 
[-2.92] 
 
[-1.82] 
 CEO Characteristics: 
     CEO appointed by government -0.128 *** -0.195 *** -0.027 
 
 
[-8.11] 
 
[-9.80] 
 
[-0.96] 
 CEO tenure 0.006 *** 0.007 *** 0.004 
 
 
[5.98] 
 
[6.18] 
 
[1.22] 
 CEO education -0.033 *** -0.035 *** -0.018 
 
 
[-6.83] 
 
[-6.85] 
 
[-0.97] 
 Corporate Governance: 
     Type of Board of Directors (BOD): None ref. 
 
ref. 
 
ref. 
   BOD with CEO/Chair separation -0.040 *** -0.039 *** -0.005 
 
 
[-3.21] 
 
[-3.39] 
 
[-0.14] 
   BOD with CEO/Chair duality 0.026 ** 0.039 *** -0.027 
 
 
[2.28] 
 
[3.27] 
 
[-0.69] 
 Senior executives have previously been fired -0.032 *** -0.040 *** 0.016 
 
 
[-2.95] 
 
[-3.39] 
 
[0.49] 
 Constant 0.813 *** 0.967 *** 0.572 *** 
 
[21.07] 
 
[27.65] 
 
[4.55] 
 Adjusted R
2
 0.125 
 
0.100 
 
0.020 
 Number of obs. 11817 
 
10274 
 
1543 
 OLS regressions. All models incorporate industry dummies and control city fixed effects. 
Model 1: full sample.   
Model 2: firms that are not majority State-owned.  
Model 3: firms that are majority State-owned. 
t statistics in brackets; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 5: Performance Pay Among CEOs In China, 2005 
Cell percentages 
 Majority ownership status: Any 
Low 
Powered 
High 
Powered 
State 71 47 23 
Collective 64 47 17 
Corporation 73 47 25 
Private 67 43 23 
Foreign 50 31 17 
No majority owner 71 44 26 
All 67 44 23 
 
Note: authors' calculations from the World Bank Investment Climate Survey 2005. Figures are 
cell percentages. Respondents asked "Is the CEO's annual income directly related to the 
company's performance?" Unweighted N=12,242. Follow up questions ask how CEO's income 
increases/decreases if company performance exceeds/fails the target with 7 categorical responses 
recording the percentage change running from 1-5% to >61%.  "Low powered" identifies 
incentive contracts with <11% income at stake. "High powered" identifies incentive contracts 
with 11% or more income at stake.  Columns 2 and 3 based on unweighted N=11,938. 
 
Table 6: Types of CEO Performance Pay 
Cell percentages 
 Majority Owner: 
 Domestic Foreign State No 
majority 
All 
Incentive plan linking income to firm 
performance 
28 20 20 18 28 
Annual pay contract (Nian Xin Zhi) 20 26 16 18 19 
Performance Bond 11 3 17 9 11 
Any of 3 above 42 39 42 39 42 
More than 1 of 3 above 15 9 16 6 15 
Holds company stock 37 23 8 6 30 
Unweighted N 1676 171 519 33 2399 
 
Note: authors' calculations from the World Bank Investment Climate Survey 2003. Figures are 
cell percentages. For row 1 question: "Does the CEO have any incentive plans linking his/her 
income to firm performance?" Row 2 question: "Is the CEO's wage paid annually (Nian Xin 
Zhi)?" Row 3 question: "Did the CEO post a security deposit?" Row 6 question: "Does the CEO 
own company stocks?" 
Table 7: OLS of the Probability that a CEO’s Pay is Linked to Performance, 2005 
Dependent variable: CEO incentive contract 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
Coeff. 
 
Coeff. 
 
Coeff
.  
Firm Characteristics: 
      
Majority ownership: State ref. 
     
Private -0.016 
     
 
[-1.02] 
     
Collective -0.003 
     
 
[-0.16] 
     
Corporative 0.015 
     
 
[1.02] 
     
Foreign -0.203 *** 
    
 
[-10.27] 
     
No majority ownership -0.02 
     
 
[-0.79] 
     
Size (Log of employees) 0.028 *** 0.023 *** 0.055 *** 
 
[8.10] 
 
[5.83] 
 
[6.04
]  
Age (Log of years) -0.006 
 
0.005 
 
-0.02
7 
** 
 
[-.094] 
 
[0.63] 
 
[-2.0
0]  
CEO Characteristics: 
      
CEO appointed by government -0.064 *** -0.018 
 
-0.10
7 
*** 
 
[-4.36] 
 
[-0.92] 
 
[-4.3
3]  
CEO tenure 0.002 ** 0.002 ** 0.003 
 
 
[2.30] 
 
[2.05] 
 
[1.17
]  
CEO education 0.044 *** 0.038 *** 0.040 ** 
 
[8.75] 
 
[7.09] 
 
[2.34
]  
Production autonomy of CEO 0.014 *** 0.019 *** 0.015 * 
 
[3.07] 
 
[3.20] 
 
[1.65
]  
Investment autonomy of CEO -0.016 *** -0.018 *** 
-0.01
6 
*** 
 
[-5.65] 
 
[-5.33] 
 
[-2.7
2]  
Employment autonomy of CEO -0.003 
 
-0.006 
 
0.001 
 
 
[-0.57] 
 
[-0.99] 
 
[0.11
]  
Corporate Governance: 
      
Type of Board of Directors (BOD): None ref. 
 
ref. 
 
ref. 
 
BOD with CEO/Chair separation 0.044 *** 0.013 
 
0.065 ** 
 
[3.59] 
 
[0.95] 
 
[2.22
]  
BOD with CEO/Chair duality 0.035 *** 0.024 * 0.055 *** 
 
[2.94] 
 
[1.85] 
 
[6.04
]  
Senior executives have previously been fired 0.057 *** 0.071 *** 0.011 
 
 
[5.73] 
 
[6.51] 
 
[0.41
]  
Constant 0.290 *** 0.317 *** 0.185 
 
 
[6.64] 
 
[7.11] 
 
[1.52
]  
Adjusted R2 0.088 
 
0.069 
 
0.137 
 
Number of obs 11817 
 
10274 
 
1543 
 
OLS regressions. All models incorporate industry dummies and control city fixed effects. 
Model 1: full sample. 
Model 2: firms that are not majority State-owned.  
Model 3: firms that are majority State-owned. 
t statistics in brackets; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 8: OLS Models for CEO Incentive Contracts, 2003 
Dependent variable: Incentive contracts 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Coeff. 
 
Coeff. 
 
Coeff. 
 
Coeff. 
 
Coeff. 
 
Coeff. 
 
Firm characteristics:             
Majority ownership: State ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  
   Domestic -0.049  -0.041  -0.027  -0.017  -0.049  -0.031  
           [-1.46]  [-1.21]  [-0.77]  [-0.48]  [-0.84]  [-0.52]  
   Foreign   -0.225 *** -0.181 *** -0.145 *** -0.121 ** -0.338 *** -0.287 *** 
           [-4.17]  [-3.50]  [-2.62]  [2.17]  [-4.43]  [-3.50]  
   No majority ownership -0.199 ** -0.180 * -0.130  -0.126  -0.336 ** -0.327 * 
           [-2.36]  [-1.98]  [-1.12]  [-1.04]  [-2.08]  [-1.86]  
Size (Log of employees) 0.017 ** 0.016 ** 0.026 *** 0.022 ** 0.053 *** 0.045 *** 
           [2.73]  [2.33]  [3.48]  [2.59]  [4.32]  [3.50]  
Age (Log of years) -0.039 ** -0.049 *** -0.005  -0.014  -0.006  -0.026  
           [-2.47]  [-3.00]  [-0.30]  [-0.86]  [-0.26]  [-0.97]  
CEO characteristics:             
CEO tenure 0.001  0.001  0.002  0.002  0.001  0.001  
           [0.60]  [0.72]  [0.51]  [0.56]  [0.28]  [0.32]  
Education: Less than graduate degree ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  
  Has graduate degree 0.082 ** 0.074 * 0.056  0.046  0.123 ** 0.102 * 
           [2.34]  [2.08]  [1.54]  [1.24]  [2.23]  [1.79]  
  Has postgraduate degree 0.153 *** 0.147 *** 0.149 *** 0.138 *** 0.313 *** 0.29 *** 
           [4.67]  [4.38]  [3.76]  [3.45]  [5.45]  [4.99]  
Production autonomy of CEO 0.004  0.004  0.003  0.004  -0.007  -0.005  
           [0.43]  [0.51]  [0.40]  [0.53]  [-0.48]  [-0.38]  
Investment autonomy of CEO -0.021 *** -0.022 *** -0.021 *** -0.022 *** -0.026 ** -0.028 ** 
           [-3.02]  [-3.11]  [-3.23]  [-3.39]  [-2.18]  [-2.26]  
Employment autonomy of CEO 0.01 * 0.012 * 0.002  0.004  0.018  0.022 * 
           [1.76]  [2.09]  [0.20]  [0.50]  [1.54]  [1.89]  
CEO appointed by government -0.045  -0.045  -0.09 *** -0.093 *** -0.156 *** -0.165 *** 
           [-1.45]  [-1.37]  [-4.25]  [-4.52]  [-3.65]  [-3.76]  
Continued 
Table 8 continued 
Dependent variable: Incentive contracts 
[1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  
Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  
Corporate governance:             
Type of Board of Directors (BOD): None ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  
   BOD with CEO/Chair separation 0.093 *** 0.002  0.094 ** 0.012  0.175 *** 0.006  
           [3.26]  [0.07]  [2.35]  [0.29]  [2.92]  [0.10]  
   BOD with CEO/Chair duality 0.069 ** -0.035  0.12 *** 0.023  0.162 *** -0.034  
           [2.85]  [-1.55]  [4.37]  [0.78]  [4.74]  [-0.93]  
Senior executives have previously been fired 0.163 *** 0.161 *** 0.145 *** 0.145 *** 0.279 *** 0.277 *** 
           [5.97]  [5.54]  [5.78]  [5.54]  [7.00]  [6.58]  
Additional controls only available for 2003 data:             
CP status: not a CP member   ref.    ref.    ref.  
  High rank in CP   0.019    0.045    0.089 ** 
             [0.86]    [1.70]    [2.23]  
  CP Member    -0.014    -0.021    -0.02  
             [-0.64]    [-0.82]    [-0.45]  
  CP status missing   0.005    -0.01    -0.07  
             [0.06]    [-0.07]    [-0.35]  
Continued 
 
Table 8 continued 
Dependent variable: Incentive contracts 
[1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] 
 
Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  
Stock ownership: no stock ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  
  CEO owns 1-49% of stock   0.043    0.04 *   0.07 ** 
             [1.65]    [1.75]    [2.28]  
  CEO owns 50%+ of stock   -0.004    0.008    0.005  
             [-0.11]    [0.19]    [0.08]  
  Don't know how much stock CEO owns   0.136 *   0.2 ***   0.357 ** 
             [1.96]    [3.38]    [2.54]  
Promotion from within   0.04 **   0.026    0.065  
             [2.42]    [1.00]    [1.44]  
Independent member(s) on Board   0.067 ***   0.064 **   0.152 *** 
   [4.07]    [2.85]    [3.37]  
Employee rep on Board   0.127 ***   0.108 ***   0.211 *** 
             [5.70]    [4.59]    [4.82]  
CEO experience before current post   -0.003 *   -0.004    -0.001  
             [-1.82]    [-1.08]    [-0.31]  
Chinese      0.019    -0.057    -0.109  
             [0.45]    [-1.19]    [-1.17]  
Constant   0.17 ** 0.156 * 0.253 *** 0.321 *** 0.216 * 0.335 ** 
           [2.45] 
 
[1.85] 
 
[3.32] 
 
[3.93] 
 
[1.83] 
 
[2.27] 
 
Adjusted-R
2
 0.109 
 
0.124 
 
0.089 
 
0.101 
 
0.109 
 
0.128 
 
Number of obs.        2203 
 
2203 
 
2203 
 
2203 
 
2203 
 
2203 
 
OLS regressions. All models incorporate industry and city dummies. 
Model 1, 2: Dependent variable is “paid via a contract linking pay to performance.” 
Model 3, 4: Dependent variable is “Whether or not three types of incentive contracts (incentive plan linking income to firm performance, annual pay contract 
(Nian Xin Zhi) or performance bond) identified.” 
Model 5, 6: Dependent variable is “the count of the three types of incentive contract.” 
t statistics in brackets. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Data Appendix 
We use data from two World Bank Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org). Our 
primary data source is the 2005 World Bank Investment Climate Survey undertaken by the 
National Bureau of Statistics in China.  It covers 12,400 firms located in 120 cities throughout 
China. One hundred firms are surveyed in each city except in the four largest cities (Shanghai, 
Tianjin, Beijing and Chongqing) where 200 were surveyed. All provincial capitals are sampled 
together with cities selected based on the economic size of the province. Firms were randomly 
selected within the ten largest industries in each province (by value added). Consequently, the 
survey covers all major cities and is broadly representative of China as a whole. 
 
We also use the World Bank Enterprise Survey from 2003. This comprises a sample of 2,400 
enterprises from 18 cities: 150 from each of 12 larger cities and 100 from each of 6 smaller 
cities. Of the cities surveyed, four are in the northeast (Benxi, Changchun, Dalian and Harbin), 
four along the coast (Hangzhou, Jiangmen, Shenzhen and Wenzhou), four in the central region 
(Changsha, Nanchang, Wuhan and Zhengzhou), and six in the western region (Chongqing, 
Guilin, Kunming, Nanning, Lanzhou and Xi’an). Both surveys are completed by the most senior 
manager at the firm. The rationale for using both surveys is two-fold. First, although smaller than 
the 2005 survey, the 2003 survey contains information on aspects of executive compensation and 
corporate governance which are absent from the 2005 data. Second, the sample frames are 
different for the two surveys. For example, the 2003 survey consists of smaller firms, and they 
are not drawn from the same locations as the 2005 survey.  Thus running similar multivariate 
analyses on both samples provides an opportunity to establish the external validity of findings 
based on the 2005 survey.  Simple descriptive statistics from the two surveys are presented 
below. 
 
In both surveys the term "General Manager" is used to identify the CEO, but throughout the 
paper we refer to this executive as the CEO. 
 
 
Appendix Table A1: Descriptive statistics, 2005 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
       
Whether CEO Pay linking to Firm Performance 11817 0.669  0.470  0 1 
 
       
Corporate governance:       
Type of Board of Directors (BOD): No BOD 11817 0.279  0.449  0 1 
 
   BOD with CEO/Chair separation 11817 0.357  0.479  0 1 
 
   BOD with CEO/Chair duality 11817 0.364  0.481  0 1 
 
Fire or demotion of CEO, last 4 years 11817 0.222  0.416  0 1 
 
 
CEO characteristics: 
      
CEO tenure (years) 11817 6.399  4.721  1 56 
 
Education of CEO 11817 5.575  0.994  1 7 
 
CEO appointed by government 11817 0.119  0.324  0 1 
 
Production autonomy of CEO 11817 7.410  1.490  1 8            
Investment autonomy of CEO 11817 6.868  2.054  1 8 
 
Employment autonomy of CEO 11817 7.305  1.587  1 8            
 
Firm characteristics: 
      
Majority ownership: State 11817 0.131  0.337  0 1 
 
   Collective 11817 0.082  0.275  0 1            
   Legal persons 11817 0.259  0.438  0 1 
 
   Private 11817 0.367  0.482  0 1            
   Foreign 11817 0.130  0.337  0 1 
 
   No majority ownership 11817 0.031  0.174  0 1            
Size (Log of employees) 11817 5.619  1.473  1.8  13.5  
 
Age (Log of years) 11817 2.277  0.786  1.1  4.9             
Coefficient of variance in sales, last 3 years 11817 0.324  0.251  0 1.7  
 
Number of power outages annually (divide by 100) 11817 0.114  0.239  0 4            
Industry: Petroleum 11817 0.014  0.119  0 1 
 
   AgProcess 11817 0.079  0.269  0 1            
   BlackMetal 11817 0.040  0.196  0 1 
 
   ChemFiber 11817 0.004  0.063  0 1            
   ChemMat 11817 0.116  0.321  0 1 
 
   ClothShoeHat 11817 0.017  0.127  0 1            
   ColorMetal 11817 0.028  0.164  0 1 
 
   CommunicateEquip 11817 0.046  0.210  0 1            
   Craft   11817 0.009  0.093  0 1 
 
   DrinkManufacture 11817 0.014  0.117  0 1            
   EduSportGood 11817 0.003  0.057  0 1 
 
   Electronics 11817 0.069  0.254  0 1            
Continued 
 
Appendix Table A1 continued 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  
       
   FoodManufacture 11817 0.020  0.140  0 1 
 
   Furniture 11817 0.004  0.067  0 1            
   GeneralEquip 11817 0.087  0.282  0 1 
 
   Instruments 11817 0.005  0.069  0 1            
   Leather 11817 0.012  0.107  0 1 
 
   Medical Equip 11817 0.034  0.182  0 1            
   Metal   11817 0.030  0.170  0 1 
 
   NonMetal 11817 0.105  0.306  0 1            
   Paper   11817 0.019  0.137  0 1 
 
   Plastic 11817 0.027  0.163  0 1            
   Printing 11817 0.005  0.069  0 1 
 
   Recycle 11817 0.000  0.016  0 1            
   Rubber  11817 0.002  0.040  0 1 
 
   SpecificEquip 11817 0.040  0.196  0 1            
   Textile 11817 0.077  0.267  0 1 
 
   Tobacco 11817 0.003  0.059  0 1            
   TransEquip 11817 0.079  0.270  0 1 
 
   WoodProcessing 11817 0.011  0.105  0 1            
 
Appendix Table A2: Descriptive statistics, 2003 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Paid via a contract linking pay to performance 2203 0.286  0.452  0 1 
Any of the three types identified 2203 0.429  0.495  0 1 
The count of the three types of incentive contract 2203 0.606  0.796  0 3 
      
Corporate governance:      
Type of Board of Directors (BOD): No BOD 2203 0.489  0.500  0 1 
   BOD with CEO/Chair separation 2203 0.268  0.443  0 1 
   BOD with CEO/Chair duality 2203 0.243  0.429  0 1 
Fire experience of senior executives 2203 0.176  0.381  0 1 
CEO appointed by government 2203 0.124  0.330  0 1 
 
CEO characteristics:  
     
CEO tenure (years) 2203 5.730  4.223  1 33 
Has graduate degree 2203 0.680  0.466  0 1 
Has postgraduate degree 2203 0.155  0.362  0 1 
Production autonomy of CEO 2203 7.082  1.699  1 8 
Investment autonomy of CEO 2203 5.694  2.624  1 8 
Employment autonomy of CEO 2203 6.568  2.135  1 8 
 
Firm characteristics: 
     
Majority ownership: Domestic 2203 0.698  0.459  0 1 
   Foreign 2203 0.070  0.255  0 1 
   State   2203 0.218  0.413  0 1 
   No majority ownership 2203 0.014  0.118  0 1 
Industry: Clothing 2203 0.147  0.354  
  
   Food    2203 0.029  0.168  0 1 
   Metals and machinery 2203 0.064  0.245  0 1 
   Electronics 2203 0.225  0.417  0 1 
   Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 2203 0.036  0.187  0 1 
   IT services 2203 0.084  0.277  0 1 
   Telecommunications 2203 0.003  0.052  0 1 
   Accounting and finance 2203 0.069  0.253  0 1 
   Advertising and marketing 2203 0.064  0.244  0 1 
   Other services 2203 0.112  0.316  0 1 
   Auto and auto components 2203 0.168  0.374  0 1 
Size (Log of employees) 2203 4.869  1.495  0.0  11.2  
Age (Log of years) 2203 2.297  0.885  0.7  4.0  
Continued 
Appendix Table A1 continued 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Additional controls only available in 2003      
CP status: Not member 2203 0.326  0.469  0 1 
High rank in CP 2203 0.420  0.494  0 1 
CP Member  2203 0.241  0.428  0 1 
CP status missing 2203 0.013  0.112  0 1 
Stock ownership: No stock 2203 0.695  0.461  0 1 
CEO owns 1-49% of stock 2203 0.181  0.385  0 1 
CEO owns 50%+ of stock 2203 0.102  0.302  0 1 
Don't know how much stock CEO owns 2203 0.022  0.148  0 1 
Promotion from within 2203 0.356  0.479  0 1 
Independent member(s) on Board 2203 0.166  0.372  0 1 
Employee rep on Board 2203 0.235  0.424  0 1 
CEO experience before current post (years) 2203 1.422  2.863  0 22 
Chinese    2203 0.959  0.199  0 1 
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